A report by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Chinese Involvement in Mining in the Arctic: Increasing or Declining?, finds that the Arctic is gaining strategic importance as climate change unlocks access to critical mineral resources for global industry and the energy transition. While China’s overseas mineral investments have surged since 2022, its participation in Arctic mining outside Russia remains limited and has declined in regions such as Canada and Greenland due to political opposition, high costs, and operational challenges. Chinese companies have historically held only a small share of Arctic mining licenses—about 2% outside Russia—and many projects have stalled or been abandoned. By contrast, Chinese investment in Russian Arctic mining is increasing, underscoring closer political and economic ties and potentially strengthening Russia’s mineral production despite Western sanctions. They write:
The minerals and metals sector has formed a significant proportion of China’s outward industrial engagement for many years. This was boosted by the promulgation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and reinforced by the China Mineral Resources Plan 2016–2020. The scale of overseas engagement by Chinese companies in minerals and metals has grown dramatically since 2022, reaching US$25 billion in the first half of 2025, second only to energy at US$44 billion. This recent growth in overseas engagement in minerals and metals has been driven mainly by the desire to secure supplies of critical minerals for China’s manufacturing industry. Since 2013, 80% of engagement in minerals and metals has taken the form of investment, with 20% in construction. In the first half of 2025, 96% was in the form of investment. Within the context of the BRI, the Arctic forms part of the Maritime Silk Road, which runs from Northeast Asia to Europe via Russian Arctic waters. Russia is the only Arctic country among the 146–150 BRI member states. […]
The aim of this study was to assess whether Chinese involvement in mining in Arctic countries and regions is increasing or declining. It covered a total of 38 mineral projects invested between 2008 and 2024: in Canada (26), Alaska (1), Greenland (5), and Russia (6). Of these 38 projects, Chinese involvement has ended in 17 (Table 6). Twelve of these are in Canada, four in Greenland, and one in Russia. Two further projects include one in Canada that is for sale and one in Greenland that is suspended. Only 19 of these 38 projects appear to be functioning as of late 2025: 13 in Canada, one in Alaska, and five in Russia. While Chinese involvement in several projects in Canada and Alaska has lasted between 15 and 20 years, only one project in Russia is of similar vintage. Four projects in Russia were entered into since 2019, with one in 2015.
The principal conclusion from this study is that Chinese involvement in mineral projects has declined sharply in Canada and Greenland. The main causes of Chinese withdrawal in Canada have been the forced sale of battery raw material projects by the Canadian government on economic security grounds and takeovers of companies in which the Chinese firms held stakes.
In contrast, Chinese involvement in Russia has increased since 2015, with five new projects, four of which commenced in or after 2019. These are mostly large, economically significant projects in which the Chinese participant is state-owned. The one exception is the lead-zinc mine in Tuva, where the private company Zijin Mining has been involved since 2006. This rise of Chinese involvement reflects the growing strength of China-Russia relations and Russia’s need for foreign capital. Only one of the six projects covered by this study has ended; that project had its license revoked due to delays in implementing the mine development plan. Although Russia’s rich resources are attractive to Chinese mining companies, the level of engagement may not increase further until international sanctions are lifted. […]
With Chinese outward investment in mining and metals increasing year by year, it is reasonable to ask why the Arctic does not seem to have been included, with the exception of Russia. One overarching reason is that the Arctic is a hostile, expensive, and risky place to undertake mineral extraction. In the case of Canada, the government has enhanced monitoring of inward investment in critical minerals, which appears to have deterred Chinese investors despite the need for the financing they offer.
There are many other regions of the world where the same minerals are available at lower cost and without the same policy obstacles. These include Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where much of Chinese overseas investment in minerals and metals has been directed in recent years.
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